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subsidiaries works to lower capital adequacy requirements. In equilibrium, however,
regulators  respond by increasing the incentives to improve asset quality, making the
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with respect to regulatory policy and MNBs‘ preferred form of representation.
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The banking industry is becoming more international. Technological changes
allow ￿nancial markets to integrate and regulatory changes have lowered bar-
riers for cross-border banking. By 1996, total assets of overseas branches
and subsidiaries of US banks exceeded $1.1 trillion. In the same year, 58 per
cent of UK loans were made by branches and subsidiaries of non-UK banks.
In Germany, 17 per cent of private commercial bank loans were made by non-
German banks.1 In spite of globalization, the banking industry is still one of
the most regulated industries in the world (Santos (2001)). Banks in most
countries have to meet solvency standards and reserve requirements, pay de-
posit insurance premiums, and accept various forms of monitoring of their
risk management systems and of their individual transactions (ensuring, for
instance, that adequate collateral was put up), etc.. The combination of ex-
tensive regulation and a trend towards integration of ￿nancial markets raises
new issues with respect to international harmonization of bank regulation.
Cross-border banking may take several forms. A bank holding com-
pany may expand business internationally by lending directly to customers
abroad from its domestic oﬃces. Alternatively it may set up branches or
subsidiaries abroad, which may raise deposits and grant loans there. With
respect to regulation, there is an important distinction between branches
and subsidiaries.
Branches established abroad are legally an integrated part of the parent
bank, and, therefore, are under the regulation of the home country. The
European Union￿s (EU￿s) single market and principle of ￿one single licence￿
allow parent banks with a licence from an EU-country to set up branches
anywhere within the EU. The parent bank needs to respect the regulatory
framework of the home country. Subsidiaries are separated as legal enti-
ties from the parent bank. These entities are separately capitalized, and
may therefore fail independently. Consequently, the subsidiary needs its
own banking licence, and must respect the regulatory framework of the host
country. Although subsidiaries are treated as a separate bank by the host
country, subsidiaries are owned (at least with majority) by the parent bank.
As the owner, the bank holding company is able to control important de-
cisions with respect to business strategy. Resources and skills within the
holding company may thus be transferred between its subsidiaries.
EU ￿gures show that subsidiaries are important in the ongoing integra-
tion (ECB,1999). In Ireland, the market share of foreign subsidiaries was
35 per cent in 1997. In the UK, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands the
market share of foreign subsidiaries in 1997 was in the range of 5 to 8 per
cent. Other markets such as Italy, Greece and Denmark have experience less
entry from foreign subsidiaries. In the Nordic countries, the largest bank
1Figures provided by Calzolari and Loranth (2001).
1Nordea has chosen to compete in the Nordic market with subsidiaries in
each of the countries Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
When the regulatory environments apparently diﬀer to such an extent
for multi-national banks (MNBs) that operate with foreign subsidiaries and
foreign branches, respectively, it becomes interesting to investigate the rela-
tive eﬀciencies of these arrangements. It appears that a MNB which expands
internationally with subsidiaries will become more directly exposed to reg-
ulatory competition, since the bank via its subsidiaries will operate under
the legislation of several countries - both the home country and the host
countries. Although these countries have agreed upon minimum standards
and supervisory principles, such as in the EU directives or the Basle Ac-
cords, substantial degrees of freedom are still left to national regulators.
Host country regulation of MNB subsidiaries then creates cross-border ex-
ternalities, where supervisors and regulators in one country are concerned
with standards in other countries.2 What sort of ineﬃciencies do the ex-
ternalities associated with this decentralized regulatory framework lead to?
May the non-cooperative aspect associated with host country regulation of
MNB subsidiaries lead to ￿nancial instability?
These are important questions in their own right, and we devote a sub-
stantial part of the paper to analyse such issues. For our purposes this analy-
sis is moreover a critical step when we evaluate and compare the economic
implications of the two forms of multi-national banking representation avail-
able to a MNB; either subsidiaries or branches. We are then interested in
aggregate economic eﬀciency as well as ￿nancial implications for the MNB.
Speci￿cally; given the regulatory environment, what form of representation
is most pro￿table for the bank? Furthermore, to what extent is the relative
pro￿tability aﬀected by international agreements that may change the reg-
ulatory setting? Should we expect to see MNBs reorganizing their forms of
foreign representation in anticipation of regulatory changes associated with
new international agreements? For the last issue, the next Basel accord may
be a case in point. The new and more comprehensive agreement is expected
to become operative in 2006, and interpreted as a re￿nement of the coop-
erative agreement, it should, according to our analysis, aﬀect the relative
pro￿tability of these representation forms. However, the analysis also re-
veals that the direction of change may depend on bank-speci￿cf a c t o r ss u c h
as the MNB￿s technology for monitoring and screening lenders. More spe-
ci￿c analyses are thus required in order to predict an MNB￿s adaptions to a
new regulatory regime.
For a MNB with subsidiaries, decentralized (non-cooperative) regulation
is modelled as multi-principal regulation of a MNB that allocates resources
towards activities that increase asset quality. As noted by Rochet (1999),
2See Vives (2001) for a discussion of the present ￿nancial regulatory arrangements
within the European Monetary Union.
2there is a trend towards more ￿exible approaches for regulating banks that
take into account the decentralized information of individual banks. He
states that ￿this means that the adverse selection paradigm of contract theory
is relevant for studying banking regulation￿. Giammarino et al. (1993) is an
early example of using the contract theory approach to the study of optimal
banking regulation.3 Here we adopt their framework to study strategic (non-
cooperative) regulation of MNBs.
A main result of this analysis is that lack of international coordination
of banking regulation works to lower capital adequacy requirements. In
equilibrium, however, regulators respond by increasing the MNB￿s incen-
tives to improve asset quality, making the probability of banking failure
insensitive to the decentralized nature of banking regulation. Ownership
of the MNB is shown to be of importance for the outcome of regulatory
competition. If the MNB is owned by shareholders from outside the market
operated by the bank (￿third-country shareholders￿), the regulatory regime
becomes more distortive since the regulators then become more eager to
extract banking pro￿t. With more ￿inside-shareholders￿, the regulatory
policy becomes more pro-bank industry oriented. Therefore, with a trend
towards more ￿exible approaches to banking regulation, we would expect
￿third-country￿-owned MNBs to be handicapped in the market.
We ￿nally compare branches and subsidiaries. If a MNB chooses a
branch structure, the home country becomes responsible for prudential reg-
ulation of the entire bank. A branch structure, therefore, works to central-
ize regulation into one single regulatory body (home-country), and removes
the regulatory competition phenomena induced by subsidiaries. Instead,
branches introduce a distortive home-bias in regulatory objectives, and cre-
ates a bene￿cial diversi￿cation eﬀect on the expected cost of bankruptcy.
Characterizing the regulatory response to the branch form, we are able to
derive comparative results with respect to loan quality, bank pro￿t and ag-
gerate welfare. Depending on the return distribution in the two markets and
the way these are aﬀected by the bank￿s actions to improve asset quality,
either branches or subsidiaries may constitute the optimal representation
form for the bank. However, due to the diversi￿cation eﬀect, aggregate eﬃ-
ciency is always highest under coordinated regulation of a branch-organized
MNB.
International coordination of regulation and supervision, and the issue
of ￿level playing ￿elds￿ in ￿nancial markets have been high on the political
agenda, but theoretical studies have until recently been rare. Calzolari and
Loranth (2001) survey speci￿c regulatory issues brought about by MNBs
3Other papers studying bank regulation, monitoring and desposit insurance schemes
emphasing the importance of asymmetry of information and the need for a mechanism
design approach are Campell et al. (1992), Chan et al. (1992) and Freixas and Gabillon
(1999). Excellent reviews of the theory of banking regulation are provided by Battacharya
et al. (1998), Freixas and Rochet (1997), and Santos (2001).
3with particular attention to solvency and prudential regulation. Calzolari
and Loranth (2002) develops a model to analyze the incentives of home and
host country regulators to intervene with prudential actions in MNBs. Both
branch- and subsidiary-organized MNBs are considered. The policy deci-
sion of the regulators is whether or not to close the bank, based on received
information about the quality of the bank. When there is complete infor-
mation exchange between the regulators, they show that the host country
regulator of a subsidiary-organized MNB has less incentive to intervene than
the home country regulator of a branch-organized MNB.
Dell￿Ariccia and Marquez (2001) analyze the incentives for independent
domestic bank regulators to coordinate regulatory policy. Their model is
consistent with branch-organized MNBs that makes banks working under
diﬀerent regulatory regimes meet in the same market. After identifying a
so-called ￿race to the bottom￿ without coordination, they investigate the
conditions under which regulators would bene￿t from coordination and,
hence, giving up independence. Somewhat related, Sinn (2001) shows that
there will be undersupply of regulation due to what he calls systems com-
petition. A positive externality of the national solvency regulation explains
the undersupply of such regulation. Boot, Dezelan and Milbourn (2000),
investigate the importance of a level playing ￿eld in a simple industrial or-
ganization model of banking competition. The cost of regulation, in terms
of lost pro￿t, is larger when the regulated banks compete in a market with
other non-regulated banks. A recent paper by Stolz (2002) introduces inter-
bank market in a model similar to Giammarino et al. (1993). Assuming a
subsidiary-organized MNB, she shows that a national supervisor/regulator
will not adequately internalize costs imposed on other economies by haz-
ardous banking behavior in her jurisdiction. The cross-country contagion
eﬀect caused by interbank lending will not be internalized by supervisors
with a national mandate only.
The present paper diﬀers from the above in several aspects. We formu-
late the regulatory game under decentralization as a common-agency. This
allows us to derive the national regulator￿s optimal response to MNBs, and,
further, to identify the sources of regulatory ineﬃciency. As pointed out
above, our analysis provides insights into the importance of bank ownership
structure, and oﬀers an explanation of MNBs￿ choice of representation form.
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Sections 2-6 consider a MNB
with a subsidiary structure. Section 2 describes the model for that setting.
Section 3 derives the optimal regulatory policy under international coordi-
nation. Section 4 derives the regulatory equilibrium without coordination.
Section 5 derives explicit solutions for regulatory policies by assuming spe-
ci￿c functional forms. In section 6 the importance of ownership is discussed.
Section 7 compares branches and subsidiaries. Section 8 concludes.
42 The Model
In Sections 3-6 we consider a multinational bank (MNB) with subsidiaries
in two diﬀerent countries, i =1 ,2. This section sets up the model for
that analysis. Each subsidiary is operating under the legislation of the host
country. In each of the two countries there are a number of ￿rms having
access to risky investment projects that need external funding, and bank
loans are assumed to be their only source of funding. The average return
of the investment projects in each country is treated as a random variable
with a distribution G(r\q) de￿ned over [r,r].H e r e q is the quality of the
loan portfolio acquired by the bank. Unless otherwise noted, an increase in
quality is assumed to shift the distribution of returns in the sense of ￿rst-
order stochastic dominance, i.e. Gq(r\q) ≤ 0 ∀ r ∈ [r,r].4 The two countries
are assumed to be identical as far as business environments are concerned.
Given the quality of the loan portfolio, therefore, the distribution of average
r e t u r ni st h es a m ei nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .I nb o t hc o u n t r i e st h e r ei sa l s oar i s k -
free asset with a rate of return equal to 1.
Loan quality. The quality of the loan portfolio in the two subsidiaries
is assumed to be a function of the innate quality of the investment projects,
the amount of resources devoted to auditing and screening of the invest-
ment projects, and country-speci￿c macroeconomic conditions. Following
our assumption of identical business environments, the innate quality of the
projects is assumed to be identical, and denoted by θ. The amount of re-
sources devoted to auditing in a subsidiary is given by ei.A d d i n g l o c a l
macroeconomic conditions βi, the quality of the loan portfolio in country i
is assumed to be given by
qi = βiθ + ei. (1)
The regulator is able to observe the realized quality of the loan portfolio in
its jurisdiction. This assumption is consistent with the periodic inspections
of bank assets that regulators undertake in practice. Admittedly, inspections
and supervisions provide only imperfect measures of asset quality, but as a
simplifying assumption this is justi￿e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e s e( i m p e r f e c t )
measures are valuable and considered to be important by the regulator.
Although the ￿nal asset quality is observed by the regulator, the MNB
has private information about the innate quality of the investment projects
θ. Having observed a given asset quality, the regulator does not know the
amount of resources the bank needed to spend on auditing in order to achieve
this level.
It is common knowledge that innate quality is distributed according to
a cumulative distribution function F(θ), with density f(θ) over an interval
4In some sections we will also consider second-order stochastic dominance. Giammarino
et al. (1993) consider both ￿rst- and second-order dominance in their model, and show




. The bank and the regulator are assumed to know the macroeconomic
situation. If there is a recession βi = β.E l s eβi = β, where β > β.L a t e r ,
β will denote β1 + β2.
Funding. At the outset, the MNB￿s only asset is that it has access to
the market of risky investment projects in the two countries. Provided that
the MNB complies with rules set up by the regulator, the bank can issue
deposits and grant loans to ￿rms with investment projects. There are two
funding sources available for the bank - outside equity and deposits. The
MNB must promise the new shareholders an expected return equal to reEi
in order to attract outside equity of size Ei to the subsidiary in country
i. re (> 1) is an exogenous expected rate of return that makes investors
willing to provide equity. The other source of funding is insured deposits
Di. To simply exposition, the bank is assumed to attract deposits of ￿xed
size in both countries. The amount of deposits are normalized to 1, i.e.
D1 = D2 =1 . Deposits are paid an interest rate equal to 1.
T h eM N B ￿ sc o s t so fi m p r o v i n ga s s e tq u a l i t yb e y o n dt h eb a s el e v e l s(β1θ)
and (β2θ) are given by ψ(e1 + e2). These costs reduce the MNB￿s initial
wealth. ψ(.) is an increasing and strictly convex function, which implies
that the MNB￿s eﬀort in the two jurisdictions are substitutes, i.e.
∂2ψ
∂e1∂e2 =
ψ00 > 0. Finally, each subsidiary must satisfy the cash ￿ow constraint
Li + Ri + Pi = Di + Ei, (2)
where Li is the amount of risky loans granted by the bank in country i,
Ri is the amount of risk-free assets kept by the bank, and Pi is the deposit
insurance premium paid in order to be allowed to run the bank in jurisdiction
i. Following Giammarino et al. (1993), we assume that Di = Li. Hence,
the size of the bank￿s activity in the two countries, in terms of risky loans,
is exogenous. This assumption highlights the important role of equity as a
means for adjusting the probability of bank default. Our focus is on the role
of regulation and supervision in aﬀecting loan quality and the probability of
banking failure.








[ri + Ri − 1]dG(ri\qi) − re
2 X
i=1
(Ri + Pi) − ψ(
2 X
i=1
qi − βθ) (3)
The ￿rst term is the expected value of the cash ￿o we a r n e di nt h et w o
jurisdictions. rb
i i st h eb r e a k - e v e nr e t u r nl e v e l . I ft h ea v e r a g er e t u r no fa
subsidiary drops below this level, the subsidiary fails, and the governmental
deposit insurance fund pays the depositors. Note that the break-even level
of return depends on the amount of reserves kept by the bank; it is given by
rb
i =1−Ri. Since equity is used to keep reserves (and to pay the insurance
premium), the role of equity is to adjust the probability of default.
6Subtracting the second term in (3), which is the cost of funding risk
free assets and the insurance premium with outside equity, we get the
insider￿s share of the cash ￿ow. Note that the outside shareholders are
not guaranteed a return equal to re. Instead, in order to provide capi-




i [ri + Ri − 1]dG(ri\qi). Outside equity is costly for the insider because
its share of the cash-￿ow (1−zi) is reduced. The last term in (3) is the cost
of improving loan quality.
Regulator￿s objective. The objective of the regulator in each jurisdic-
tion is to provide deposit insurance at lowest possible costs for the society.
The net payoﬀ to the government from providing deposit insurance is given
by (note that the second term is negative due to the de￿nition of rb
i)




[ri + Ri − 1]dG(ri\qi) (4)
The ￿rst term in the bracket is the value of the insurance premium collected
by the regulator, and the last term is the expected loss from a banking fail-
ure. b captures the additional bankruptcy cost due to negative externalities.
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The regulator dislikes leaving extra-normal pro￿t to the bank. The reason is
that excessive pro￿t could instead be transferred to the regulator￿s insurance
fund (by increasing the insurance premium), and by this reducing the cost
of providing deposit insurance. Noting that global surplus for the regulators






i [ri + Ri − 1]dG(ri\qi)+( 1+b)
R rb
i
r [ri + Ri − 1]dG(ri\qi)}
−re P2
i=1 Ri − ψ(
P2
i=1 qi − βθ) − π
)
(6)
If the regulator￿s objective function includes domestic bank pro￿t, we
will have Wi =( 1+λ)Si + δiπ, where Si is now the expected payoﬀ to the
government from the deposit insurance. Here λ is the general equilibrium
shadow costs of public funds (assumed equal in the two countries), and δi
is the ownership share of country i. In this case a regulatory scheme that
generates bank pro￿t is less costly for the regulator. The importance of
bank ownership is treated in section 6.
73 Cooperative regulation of the MNB
In this section a single regulator maximizes the global surplus of the deposit
insurance scheme. The policy instruments available to the regulator are the
required amount of risk free asset to be held by the bank Ri and the insurance
premium Pi.I n e ﬀect, this also determines the level of outside equity Ei.
In addition, the regulator speci￿es the level of asset quality the bank should
achieve qi. However, when choosing a regulatory policy, the regulator suﬀers
from asymmetry of information. The regulator does not know the quality of
the business environment, which is crucial for the bank￿s cost of acquiring
a certain quality level of the loan portfolio.
Following standard procedures, the regulatory policy can be analyzed in
terms of a direct revelation mechanism. In our case, this means that the bank
makes a report on the intrinsic quality of the business environment ￿ θ,a n dt h e
regulator responds by oﬀering a regulatory package
n
Pi(￿ θ),R i(￿ θ),q i(￿ θ)
o
,i=
1,2, from a pre-announced menu. According to the Revelation Principle, any
indirect mechanism that links the reserve requirements and the insurance
premium to the asset quality qi, has its equivalence in a direct mechanism
which makes the MNB report its true type θ.
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qi(θ) − βθ), (8)
where π0(θ)=
∂π(b θ\θ)
∂θ for b θ = θ. Integration by parts gives the following









qi(θ) − βθ)(1 − F(θ))dθ (9)
where π(θ)=0due to costly rents.
Maximizing expected W w.r.t
n
Ri(￿ θ),q i(￿ θ)
o
subject to (9) de￿nes the



















,i =1 ,2 (10)
8(1 + b)G(rb
i\qi(θ)) + [1 − G(rb
i\qi(θ))] − re =0 ,i =1 ,2 (11)
Increasing the quality of the loan portfolio, the expected cash-￿ow increases,
and the probability of paying the bankruptcy cost b decreases. The optimal
policy balances this eﬀect against the auditing costs associated with in-
creased quality (the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (10)) and additional
information rent captured by the bank (the second term on the right-hand
side of (10)). When quality is increased, the bank￿s gain from misrepre-
senting the innate quality θ increases as well, and this will materialize as
increased bank pro￿t due to the truth-telling constraint. Therefore, private
information introduces a distortion in the choice of quality of the loan port-
folio in order to improve the regulator￿s extraction of rents. The distortion
entails a reduction in loan quality (less monitoring eﬀort) for all types of
banks except the one with the most promising business environment (θ).
Condition (11) determines the optimal level of reserve requirements (or
outside equity). The cost of outside equity should be balanced against
the bene￿t from reduced bankruptcy costs. As already pointed out by Gi-
ammarino et al. (1993), this rule implies that the probability of a banking
failure is independent of induced quality of the loan portfolio. A low quality
bank, therefore, is induced to hold more equity and to keep more reserves
as a buﬀer against losses. Moreover, private information in banking (in-
ducing lower quality of the loan portfolio), is compensated for by increased
reserve requirements. The capital to loan ratio, therefore, should increase
as a response to private information.
We may further note that there is a regulatory induced contagion of
macroeconomic shocks between the two countries. If one of the two countries
experiences an economic downturn (βi = β), the regulatory induced quality
of the loan portfolios in both countries are aﬀected with equal strength.5
There are two eﬀects at work here. First, the marginal cost associated with
a certain level of quality increases (as seen from the ￿rst term on the right-
hand side of (10)). This works to reduce induced quality in both countries.
Second, as seen from the second term on the right-hand side of (10), a low
βi makes rent extraction less important. This works to increase quality.
The second eﬀect, however, disappears as the intrinsic quality of the bank
loans approaches θ.6 Banks of suﬃciently high intrinsic quality, therefore,
will experience a deterioration of induced quality of the loan portfolio in both
markets if one of the markets experiences an economic downturn. Banks of
suﬃciently low intrinsic quality may actually experience an improvement of
loan quality in both markets if there is an economic downturn in one of the
5The result that loan qualities are aﬀected exactly equally in both countries is in part
a consequence of the modelling assumption that the quality variables enter additively in
the cost function. Other formulations with qualities being substitutes for the MNB would
yield similar, but not equal contagion eﬀects.
6This is due to the ￿no distortion at the top￿- property. The second term disappears
when θ = θ since F(θ)=1 .
9markets (see the parametric speci￿cation in section 5).
Moreover, if one of the two countries experiences an economic downturn
and the subsidiary in the other country is induced to reduce the quality of
the loan portfolio, the MNB will face higher capital requirements in both
markets (in order to keep the probability of a banking failure constant).
We can summarize the ￿ndings so far in the following result:
Proposition 1 ( i )C o m p a r e dw i t ht h e￿r s tb e s t( s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o n )
solution, too little eﬀort is devoted to loan quality improvement when there is
international coordination of banking regulation; qC(θ) <q FB(θ) for θ < ﬂ θ.
(ii) Reserve requirements increase as a response to private information. For
the parametric speci￿cation given in section 5 it is further true that: (iii)
an economic downturn in one country causes a detoriation of loan quality in
both countries for banks with suﬃciently high intrinsic quality (θ ≥ Eθ),a n d
an improvement of loan quality in both countries for banks with suﬃciently
low intrinsic quality (θ <E θ).(iv) An economic downturn in one country
causes an increase in the capital ratio in both countries for banks with suf-
￿ciently high intrinsic quality (θ ≥ Eθ), and a reduction in the capital ratio
in both countries for banks with suﬃciently low intrinsic quality (θ <E θ).
4 Non-cooperative regulation of the MNB
We now turn to a situation in which the two regulators do not coordinate
their regulatory policies towards the banking sector. Instead, the regula-
tory authorities in the two countries choose reserve requirements, insurance
premia (i.e set capital requirements) and set targets with respect to the
qualities of the loan portfolios independently. The MNB relates to each
regulator separately. They cannot credibly share information and they act
non-cooperatively.7
We characterize the regulatory policy of country 1 (Country 2 has an
analogous problem). The regulator seeks to maximize the expected domestic
surplus, subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
The regulator of country 1 now has to take into account that its choice of
regulatory rules (reserve requirements and insurance premium) has strategic
implications for the behavior of country 2.
To take care of the strategic interaction between regulators, the regula-
tory policy of country 2 is characterized by a policy rule R2(q2) and P2(q2),
specifying the reserve requirements and the premium to be paid in country
2 as a function of the realized loan quality level in that country. (Under rel-
atively mild conditions￿essentially unrestricted communication between the
7There is an established literature on the regulation of multinational enterprises that
focuses on tax policy issues, see e.g. Bond and Gresik (1996), Calzolari (2001), Olsen and
Osmundsen (2001, 2003). The general analysis of common agency with adverse selection
was developed by Martimort (1992) and Stole (1992), see also Martimort and Stole (2002).
10agent and each principal￿there is no loss of generality in assuming that each
country oﬀers such a policy, see Martimort and Stole (2002).) Given the
policy of country 2, country 1 chooses its best policy towards the domestic
subsidiary. With a slight abuse of notation, let ￿ π(R1,P 1,q 1,θ) denote the
MNB￿s indirect pro￿t function vis-a-vis country 1; i.e.
￿ π1(R1,P 1,q 1,θ)=m a x
q2
π(R1,P 1,q 1,R 2(q2),P 2(q2),q 2,θ) (12)
where π(R1,P 1,q 1,R 2,P 2,q 2,θ) is the MNB￿s direct pro￿td e ￿ned by (3).
Let ￿ q2(q1,θ) be the MNB￿s optimal choice in (12); it is given by the ￿rst-
order condition
0=R0(￿ q2)[1 − G(1 − R2(￿ q2)\￿ q2)] +
Z r
1−R2(￿ q2)
[r2 + R2(￿ q2) − 1]dG(r2\￿ q2)
−re[(R0
2(￿ q2)+P0
2(￿ q2)] − ψ0(q1 +￿ q2 − βθ) (13)
It is important to note that policy measures taken by the regulator in country
1t oi n ￿uence the domestic quality level q1, will induce a response by the
￿rm so that the foreign quality level q2 =￿ q2 will be aﬀe c t e da sw e l l .F o ra
given regulatory policy from the foreign country, the marginal eﬀect
∂￿ q2
∂q1 can
in principle be found from (13).
Given the policy of country 2, the optimal policy of country 1 can be
found by applying the Revelation Principle in the usual way, taking into
account that the relevant pro￿t function for the MNB is now the indirect
pro￿tf u n c t i o n￿ π1() de￿ned by (12).
Incentive compatibility requires that the ￿rm￿s rent π1(θ) now satis￿es
π0
1(θ)=∂￿ π1
∂θ .S i n c ew eh a v e∂￿ π1
∂θ = ∂π
∂θ b yt h ee n v e l o p ep r o p e r t y ,w es e et h a t
equations corresponding to (8) and (9) must hold for the rent π1(θ),w i t h
now q2 =￿ q2(q1,θ) s u b s t i t u t e do nt h eR H So ft h ee q u a t i o n s . S p e c i ￿cally,
a bank with innate quality θ + dθ can always mimic a bank with lower
innate quality θ and by that save ￿eﬀort￿ costs amounting to βψ0dθ,s ot h e
regulatory scheme in country 1 must allow for this rent diﬀerential; i.e. we
must have
π0
1(θ)=βψ0(q1(θ)+￿ q2(q1(θ),θ) − βθ) (14)
Maximization of the expected value of the national objective W1 given in (4),
subject to IC constraints represented by the equivalent of (9), and taking








[r1 + R1 − 1]dGq1(r1\q1)
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1\q1(θ)) + [1 − G(rb
1\q1(θ))] − re =0 . (16)
11The left-hand side of the ￿rst equation captures the marginal national gains
of increased domestic loan quality, just as in the cooperative case represented
by (10). The right-hand side of the equation captures the marginal costs,
consisting of marginal resource costs devoted to screening and auditing (the
￿rst term) and increased rents (the second term). Compared to the coop-
erative case, the only diﬀerence is that the term accounting for increased
rents now contains an additional factor, namely the bank￿s foreign quality
response
∂￿ q2
∂q1. Intuitively, when the national regulator induces the bank to
increase the domestic quality level by one unit, the bank adjusts the foreign
quality such that the extra resources required to achieve the new domestic
level is 1+
∂￿ q2
∂q1. From (14) we then see that the increase in rents will be
βψ00 • (1 +
∂￿ q2
∂q1), and this explains the last term in (15).
The quality levels are substitutes for the bank, and the foreign quality
response will then be negative;
∂￿ q2
∂q1 < 0, see below. By inducing the MNB to
increase domestic loan quality, the local regulator provokes a ￿soft￿ response
by the foreign regulator; the MNBs subsidiary in country 2 is induced to
lower its loan quality. This implies that the national regulator perceives
the costs associated with increased rents to be smaller than does the supra-
national regulator, and hence that he has less of an incentive to distort
quality downwards to extract rents. Other things equal, the national regu-
lator will therefore implement a higher domestic quality level for the bank￿s
loans.8
Equation (16) is the national regulator￿s optimality condition for the do-
mestic subsidiary￿s reserve requirements (R1). Variations in these require-
ments do not generate repercussions for the bank￿s foreign operations, and
conditional on the domestic level of loan quality, reserve requirements will
therefore be eﬃcient. However, since domestic loan quality will deviate from
the level that is optimal under cooperative regulation, reserve requirements
will also deviate from the cooperative levels.
In equilibrium we must have ￿ q2(q1(θ),θ)=q2(θ), and from (13) we then













2+Hθ =0 , where subscripts on H denote par-
tials. Elimination of H2 yields the stated formula.) Similar considerations
8This result follows from our assumption about the cost of improving loan quality.
An increase in eﬀort in subsidiary 1 increases the marginal cost of eﬀort in subsidiary
2. Hence, there is an underlying assumption about scarce managerial resources in the
MNB. If we instead allowed for ￿learning-by-doing￿ eﬀects, the marginal costs of eﬀort in
subsidiary 2 would have decreased (if eﬀort in subsidiary 1 increases). In this case, the
foreign quality response will be positive,
∂￿ q2
∂q1 > 0 (complements), and the common-agency
eﬀect would cause a detoriation of loan quality.
12apply for the regulator in country 2, and it then follows that in equilibrium








[ri + Ri − 1]dGqi(ri\qi)












i\qi(θ)) + [1 − G(rb
i\qi(θ))] − re =0 , (18)
where i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j. Following a procedure similar to Martimort
(1992,1996), one can see that if this system of diﬀerential equations de￿nes
a pair of nondecreasing loan quality schedules q1(θ) and q2(θ), and those
schedules in addition satisfy a set of implementability conditions, they con-
stitute a pure-strategy diﬀerential Nash-equilibrium outcome for the com-
mon agency game. The implementability conditions imply that the response
eﬀects
∂￿ qj
∂qi are negative, which in turn implies, as we have seen, that quality
levels are higher than under cooperative regulation.
As commented above, the optimal level of reserve requirements as a
function of domestic loan quality is unchanged, and is given by (18). This
gives the following result:
Proposition 2 Compared with international coordination, strategic regula-
tion of a MNB entails (i) higher loan quality and (ii) reduced capital ratios
in both countries. The combined eﬀect of these strategic adjustments makes
the probability of a banking failure remain the same.
The reason why regulatory policy induces the MNB to reduce loan qual-
ity in the ￿rst place, is the rent extraction eﬀect. The regulatory authority,
which is concerned about the social cost of its deposit insurance scheme,
dislikes leaving extra-normal rents to the MNB since this could instead have
been added to the deposit insurance premium. Hence, a more demanding
regulatory regime, in the sense of increased incentives for improving loan
quality, is desirable from the MNB￿s point of view. In other words, the MNB
bene￿ts from the lack of an internationally coordinated policy towards reg-
ulation and supervision of banks. From (17) we see that the macroeconomic
condition aﬀects the strategic eﬀect: If there is an economic downturn (β
drops), the foreign quality response (
∂￿ qi
∂qj)i sw e a k e n e d
5A p a r a m e t r i c s p e c i ￿cation
In this section we derive explicit solutions of regulatory policies by assuming
speci￿c functional forms. We suppose here that G(r\qi)=G( r
Q(qi)) where
G(t) is a CDF on some interval [0,ﬂ t] and Q(qi) is increasing. Then a higher
quality level qi will shift the distribution of returns ri to a more favorable
one in terms of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.
135.1 Coordinated regulation
In the appendix we show that the optimality condition for qi can now be
written as




where m(re,b) is increasing in re and decreasing in b.
Further, we assume that ψ() is quadratic; ψ(e)=c
2e2,a n dt h a tθ is
uniform on [0,1] Suppose moreover that
Q0(qi)= ￿ Q1qi + ￿ Q2, ￿ Qi ≥ 0
The ￿ Qk− parameters can be seen as measures of the marginal productivity
of quality with respect to improving loan returns. Then optimal qi under
coordinated regulation is given by
m(re,b)( ￿ Q1qi + ￿ Q2)=c(q1 + q2 − βθ)+βc(1 − θ),i =1 ,2
For symmetric countries (where q1 = q2) there is a well de￿ned solution
(denoted by qC) provided m(re,b) ￿ Q1 < 2c,a n dt h e n
qC(θ)=
m ￿ Q2 + cβ(2θ − 1)
2c − m ￿ Q1
,m = m(re,b), m ￿ Q1 < 2c
Comparing with the ￿rst-best solution (with symmetric information about
θ)
qFB(θ)=
m ￿ Q2 + cβθ
2c − m ￿ Q1
we see that the quality levels are distorted downwards under asymmetric in-





increases with cβ and decreases with m ￿ Q2.
5.2 Non-cooperative regulation
The equilibrium condition for q1 is in this case (this follows from (??)):








(1 − θ). (19)
Similarly for q2. We seek linear (and symmetric) solutions for the quality
pro￿les
q1(θ)=q2(θ)=qnc(θ)=ﬂ q − (1 − θ)q0 (20)
As shown in the appendix this yields
ﬂ q =
m ￿ Q2 + cβ
2c − m ￿ Q1
= qFB(ﬂ θ)






−m1 +5 c −
q¡
m2
1 − 2m1c +9 c2¢¶
, m1 = m(re,b) ￿ Q1
The slope q0 of the equilibrium quality pro￿le qnc(θ) is increasing in β and
in m1. The implementability condition 2q0 ≤ β is satis￿ed only for m1 ≤ 0,
hence the non-cooperative equilibrium requires ￿ Q1 ≤ 0, i.e. non-increasing
returns in the production of quality. Comparing qnc(θ) with the cooperative
solution qC(θ), we ￿nd that the latter pro￿le is steeper (q0 <q 0
C), and,
hence, that there is more provision of quality in the non-cooperative case
(qnc(θ) >q C(θ)). This is due to the presence of a strategic eﬀect in the
latter case.
We observe that, for ￿ Q1 =0we have q0 =
β
2 and hence qnc(θ)=qFB(θ).
In this (extreme) case the strategic eﬀect (the foreign quality adjustment) is
so strong that none of the national regulators ￿nds it worth while to distort
domestic quality from the ￿rst-best level. Any domestic distortion would
be completely oﬀset by the bank switching more of its quality enhancing
resources to the subsidiary in the other country. In this case the quality
variables are perfect substitutes for the bank, and it isn￿t possible for any
of the non-coordinated regulators to use unilateral quality distortions to
extract rents from the MNB. In equilibrium there will thus be no distortions,
and the ￿rst-best quality levels are realized. With coordinated eﬀorts the
two regulators will however be able to extract rents this way, and in fact the
optimal relative distortion
qFB(θ)−qC(θ)
qFB(θ) was seen to be independent of the
parameter ￿ Q1.
For negative values of ￿ Q1, i.e. when the marginal productivity of quality
is decreasing with more quality in each country, the quality variables are no
longer perfect substitutes for the bank, and then it becomes possible for each
regulator to extract rents by unilateral distortions of domestic quality. The
non-cooperative equilibrium will then involve distortions from the ￿rst-best
in each country, but the distortions will be smaller than in the cooperative
case.
6 Regulatory competition with ownership eﬀects
So far we have assumed that the regulatory policy towards the MNB is
derived from the regulator￿s concern about the cost of the deposit insurance
fund. As noted above, an alternative would be to allow the regulator to care
also about the banking pro￿t falling to domestic owners. In that case the
objective function of the regulator is given by Wi =( 1+λ)Si+δiπ, where δi
is the ownership share of country i shareholders, λ is the general equilibrium
shadow cost of public funds (assumed equal in the two countries), and Si is
the social cost of the deposit insurance fund (previously denoted Wi).
15Following the above procedure, the modi￿ed regulatory policy under






















We see that the previous analysis captures the case in which the entire MNB
is owned by a third country (δ1 = δ2 =0 ). As we should expect, a regulator
caring for banking pro￿t (in addition to the social cost of running the deposit
insurance fund), will be less eager to extract rents, and, hence, loan quality
will be higher (everything else equal).
Assuming, instead, strategic regulation by each country, the non-cooperative






















,i =1 ,2 (21)
This reveals the ownership eﬀect of strategic banking regulation. As be-
fore, we identify the strategic eﬀect due to the soft response of the other
country (
dq2
dq1 < 0), which explains the increase in loan quality from lack
of coordination. However, when bank pro￿ts enter the objective function,
the importance of rent extraction (induced by lowering loan quality) diﬀers
between a domestic regulator and an international regulatory body. A do-
mestic regulator will be more tempted to extract rent since a smaller share
of the banking pro￿t enters domestic welfare. This is seen in the above
expressions by noticing that 1+λ − δi > 1+λ − δ1 − δ2.H e n c e , t h e
domestic regulator puts more weight on the rent extraction eﬀect than an
international regulatory body. This works against the strategic eﬀect, and
we cannot generally determine whether loan quality is higher or lower under
strategic banking regulation than under international coordination.9
From the equilibrium conditions it is clear that the pattern of ownership
will have implications for regulatory policy. Following Olsen and Osmund-
sen (2001), we can derive some comparative results regarding coordinated
versus strategic regulation. As already noted, if δ1 = δ2 =0 ,o w n e r s h i p
eﬀects are absent, and strategic regulation leads to higher loan quality in
both countries. Assuming that the solutions vary continuously with the pa-
rameters (which is shown to hold in our parametric speci￿cation), this will
9A similar eﬀect is present in Martimort (1996), who studies the implications of a
pro-￿rm bias on the part of regulators in a setting with contract complements.
16also be the case for suﬃciently small values of δ1 and δ2. Assuming instead
that δ1 + δ2 =1 ,a n dt h a tλ =0 , there is no rent extraction under coordi-
nation (since pro￿t is equally valuable as surplus in the deposit insurance
fund). Under strategic regulation, however, the loan quality is distorted
downwards in order to extract rent. The reason is that 1 $ increase in the
deposit insurance premium, reduces domestic pro￿tb yδi $( <1). Hence,
lack of international coordination banking regulation will causes a down-
ward distortion in loan quality. Again, by assuming continuity, that same
will hold for λ suﬃciently small and δ1 +δ2 suﬃciently close to 1.T h i sc a n
be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose two countries are symmetric. (i) If both λ and the
outside (third country) ownership share 1−δ1−δ2 are suﬃciently small, then
strategic banking regulation leads to lower loan quality (and higher capital
ratios) in both countries compared to a situation with international coordi-
nation. (ii) If the outside ownership share is suﬃciently large, then strategic
banking regulation leads to higher loan quality (and lower capital ratios) in
both countries compared to a situation with international coordination.
The eﬀect of ownership structure on banking regulation may have conse-
quences for what kind of ownership a MNB may end up with. As seen from
(21), if the shareholders in both countries symmetrically sell their shares
to third-country shareholders, then the MNB will be induced to lower its
loan quality (since rent extraction becomes more important for the national
regulators), and banking pro￿t( π(θ)) will tend to fall. A MNB, therefore,
will bene￿t from being owned by shareholders from the markets in which the
MNB operates. If a third-country shareholder sets up a new foreign bank
with subsidiaries in each of these foreign markets, the charter-value of the
bank will actually increase if it is sold to shareholders from these countries.
7 Branches versus subsidiaries.
The above analysis has considered a multi-national bank operating with
subsidiaries. As pointed out in the introduction, a bank may alternatively
expand in foreign markets by setting up branches. In this section we analyze
the eﬀect of a MNB￿s organizational form on regulatory policy, which in turn
may add explanation to what type of organizational form the MNB would
prefer.
7.1 Regulation of a MNB with branches
When choosing between branches and subsidiaries, the MNB should take
into account the regulatory response to its choice. If a MNB chooses a branch
structure, the home country becomes responsible for prudential regulation
17of the entire bank. Hence, a branch structure works to centralize regulation
into one single regulatory body, and thus removes the regulatory competition
phenomena induced by subsidiaries.
In spite of this, the regulation of a branch-organized MNB will not yield
t h ec o o r d i n a t e dp o l i c yd e r i v e di ns e c t i o n3a sa no u t c o m e .W i t hr e s p e c tt o
the probability of experiencing a bank failure, there will be bene￿ts from
pooling risky bank loans in the two markets into one single corporate entity.
A bank failure will now occur only if the sum of returns in the two markets
drops below the sum of reserves and deposits, i.e. a branch-organized bank
will fail when
r1 + r2 < 2 − R ≡ rb,
where R is total reserves held by the MNB. Here rb is the break-even level
of return of the MNB.10 F o rg i v e nl e v e lo fr e s e r v e sa n dq u a l i t y ,t h ediversi-
￿cation eﬀect of the branch form implies that the regulator is less likely to
pay a social cost of ￿nancial distress (b), given reserve requirements.
Home country regulation may also aﬀect regulatory objectives. From
the perspective of the home country regulator, the cost of ￿nancial distress
abroad may be of lesser concern (home-bias). We take account of this home-
bias eﬀect by assuming that the home regulator takes the social cost of ￿nan-
cial distress to be kb, with k<1.T h ef r a c t i o n(1−k) is then the proportion
of the negative bankruptcy externalities born by the branch￿s host country.
Absent international cooperation, the home country regulator will not take
these externalities into account when designing the regulatory policy. Then
there is of course scope for a Pareto-improving international agreement. An
eﬃcient agreement will internalize all losses, and will therefore be designed
with full weight (k =1 )being given to all costs of ￿nancial distress. In
line with this we will refer to the cases k =1and k<1 as the coopera-
tive and the non-cooperative cases, respectively, for this setting. Due to the
diversi￿cation eﬀect, coordinated regulation of a branch-organized MNB is
always preferable to coordinated regulation of a subsidiary-organized MNB,
in terms of aggregate welfare of the regulators.
Let ￿ G(r\q1,q 2) be the CDF for the sum r = r1 + r2. The home country
regulator￿s payoﬀ may now be written
Wi = reP +( 1+kb)
Z rb
r
[r + R − 2]d ￿ G(r\q1,q 2), (22)




[r + R − 2]d ￿ G(r\q1,q 2) − re(R + P) − ψ(
2 X
i=1
qi − βθ) (23)
10We assume that the market structure of the MNB is not aﬀected by the choice of
representation form. Hence, the amount of desposits and risky loans in the two markets
are unchanged (i.e. D1 = D2 = L1 = L2 =1 ). One reason could be that it will be diﬃcult
to collect deposits in foreign markets if the bank is not involved in the loan market as well.
18The incentive compatibility constraint is not aﬀected by the branch form,
and is as before given by (8).




E(ri − 1\qi) − (re − 1)R + kb
Z rb
r




qi − βθ) − π (24)




d ￿ G(r\q1,q 2)=re − 1
Reserves should always be set such that the probability of a bank failure
is equal to the marginal cost of equity relative to social cost of bankruptcy
(re−1





r dG(ri\qi)=re − 1.11 This yields the following result:
Proposition 4 If part of the social cost of a MNB bankruptcy is not born
by the home-country regulator (k<1), an entire branch-organized MNB is
more likely to fail than a MNB-subsidiary.
We now turn to the regulator￿s choice of quality incentives. Maximizing
(24) with respect to qi, subject to the IC constraint, gives the following
condition for the optimal policy towards a branch-organized MNB:
Eqi [r1 − 1] + kb
Z rb
r











The positive contributions from the terms involving E(ri\qi) and the cost
of quality (right-hand side) are the same as under coordinated regulation
of a MNB with subsidiaries. The contributions from the terms involving
bankruptcy losses, however, are diﬀerent.
To what extent the organizational form is important for incentives (and
thus for the quality of the loan portfolios), depends on the eﬀe c tt h a tt h i s
form has on the marginal social bene￿to fq u a l i t y .F o ri n s t a n c e ,i ft h em a r -
g i n a ls o c i a lb e n e ￿t of quality is lower under the branch form (taking into
11Since ￿ G(r\q1,q 2)=P r ( r1 + r2 ≤ r\q1,q 2) < Pr(ri ≤ r\qi)=G(r\qi), we must
obviosly have r
b =2− R>1 − Ri = r
b
i.
19account the equilibrium response on reserves R) , then a branch-organized
MNB will be induced to lower the quality of its loans. Since the incentive
compatibility constraint due to private information is not aﬀected by the or-
ganizational form, this would also imply that pro￿ts (information rents) for
the MNB are lower. In what follows, therefore, we compare the regulator￿s
marginal bene￿ts of quality under the two organizational forms; the branch
form and the subsidiary form, respectively.
The bankruptcy losses are potentially aﬀected by the organizational
form. In the branch case the marginal bene￿t of higher quality on those
losses accounted for by the regulator can be written (using integration by


























It is not possible to state whether quality will increase or decrease under
branch regulation just by comparing the general expressions of the marginal
social bene￿ts of quality. In order to gain more insight about what deter-
mines the eﬀect of the branch form on banking regulation, we analyze some
parametric functional forms
7.2 Parametric speci￿cations.
In the following we will analyze two sets of parametric speci￿cations for
the distribution of returns ri. These speci￿cations illustrate a range of ef-
fects that the organizational form may have on regulatory outcomes under
cooperative (centralized) as well as non-cooperative (decentralized) regula-
tory regimes. In principle we want to compare outcomes in terms of loan
qualities, bank pro￿ts and aggregate welfare for four settings:
(i) non-cooperative (home-biased) regulation of a branch-organized MNB
(ii) cooperative regulation of a branch-organized MNB
(iii) cooperative regulation of a subsidiary-organized MNB
(iv) non-cooperative regulation of a subsidiary-organized MNB
As pointed out above, aggregate welfare is always largest when the MNB
has the branch form and is cooperatively regulated, i.e. in setting (ii).12
We consider ￿rst a speci￿cation where the average returns on loans r1
and r2 are jointly normally distributed (￿i,σi) with correlation ρ,a n dw h e r e
12In the special case of perfectly correlated returns, the diversi￿cation eﬀect disap-
pears, and aggregate welfare of the regulators is the same under coordinated regulation of
branches and subsidiaries.
20quality qi aﬀects ￿i or σi. When higher quality increases the mean ￿i,t h e
(marginal) distribution becomes more favorable in a FOSD sense, and the
shift is of an ￿additive￿ type; it represents a horizontal shift of the CDF for
ri.W h e nq u a l i t ya ﬀects (reduces) the standard deviation σi of the normally
distributed return ri, the distribution becomes more favorable in a SOSD
sense. In both cases we ￿nd that loan qualities and the MNB￿s pro￿ts are
increasing (sometimes weakly) going from (i) a non-cooperatively to (ii) a
cooperatively regulated branch form, and further to (iii) a cooperatively reg-
ulated and ￿nally (iv) a non-cooperatively regulated subsidiary form. The
diﬀerences tend to be ampli￿ed, the less positively correlated are the re-
turns. Under both regulatory regimes the MNB prefers (sometimes weakly)
the subsidiary form, and unless returns are perfectly correlated, it strictly
prefers the setting (iv) to all the other settings.
O u rs e c o n ds p e c i ￿cation is one where average returns ri are of the form
ri = Q(qi)zi (25)
and where z1,z 2 are iid on some ￿xed interval [0, ﬂ z]. For simplicity we take
this to be the uniform distribution on [0,1].I nt h i ss p e c i ￿cation an increase
of quality qi will induce a shift to a distribution that is more favorable in a
FOSD sense, and the shift is ￿multiplicative￿, not merely ￿additive￿ as in the
case considered above. The results are also diﬀerent. With some additional
assumptions regarding the functional forms of Q(.),ψ() and F(.) we ￿nd the
following:
For independent returns, the marginal social bene￿ts of quality are larger
in the branch case, and they are largest under non-cooperative regula-
tion. Loan qualities and bank pro￿ts are thus lowest in setting (iii) co-
operative regulation of subsidiaries, and they increase going from this set-
ting to (ii) cooperative regulation and further to (i) non-cooperative reg-
ulation of a branch-organized bank. Loan qualities and pro￿ts in setting
(iv) (non-cooperative regulation of subsidiaries) may be either higher or
lower than in setting (i); the MNB may thus￿depending on the prevailing
parameters￿prefer either a branch structure or a subsidiary structure un-
der non-cooperative regulation. Under cooperative regulation it prefers a
branch structure.
Normally distributed returns: quality aﬀects means or variances.
Suppose now that returns r1 and r2 are jointly normally distributed
(￿i,σi) with correlation ρ,a n dw h e r eq u a l i t yqi aﬀects ￿i or σi.T h e n
r = r1 + r2 is normally distributed with mean ￿1 + ￿2 and variance ￿ σ2 =
σ2
1 + σ2
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21where φ(.) is the standardized normal CDF. The break-even return levels
chosen for a subsidiary and a branch-organized MNB, rb
















= ￿ G(rb\q1,q 2)=φ(
rb − ￿1 − ￿2
￿ σ





Comparing (26) and (27), we see that the home-bias (k<1), works to reduce
reserve requirements. The eﬀect on reserve requirements also depends on
the degree of correlation between the two markets (ρ). I n s p e c t i o no f( 2 6 )
and (27) reveals the following result:
Proposition 5 With normally distributed returns, reserve requirements of
a branch-organized MNB will be smaller than the sum of reserve requirements
of a subsidiary-organized MNB, for given quality.
Proof. We have rb < 2rb
i if 2σiφ−1(re−1
b ) > ￿ σφ−1(re−1
kb ). This holds if




kb ) > 1. By symmetry we will have σ1 = σ2,
and thus ￿ σ = σi
p
2(1 + ρ) ≤ 2σi. The inequality ￿ σ < 2σiΦ then holds since
Φ > 1 for k<1.
Considering again the marginal social bene￿ts of quality qi,w ew a n tt o

































rb − ￿1 − ￿2
￿ σ
)dr
Quality may aﬀect either the mean or the variance of the distribution. In
the ￿mean-shifting￿ case where more quality increases ￿i,w e￿nd that the
marginal social bene￿ts of quality are equal across organizational forms. Un-
der cooperative regulation the bank is thus induced to achieve the same loan
qualities and hence obtains the same pro￿ts irrespective of organizational
form. Moreover, non-cooperative (home biased) regulation of the branch
form yields no distortions compared to cooperative regulation of such an
organized MNB. Since non-cooperative regulation of an MNB with sub-
sidiaries yields excess qualities and excess pro￿ts (compared to cooperative
regulation), it then follows that the MNB￿s pro￿ts in this case are overall
highest when it has the subsidiary form and it is subject to a non-cooperative
regulatory regime.
22When quality aﬀects (reduces) the standard deviation σi,w e￿nd that
the marginal social bene￿ts of increased quality are strictly larger for the
subsidiary bank form. Moreover, non-cooperative (home biased) regulation
of the branch form yields downwards distortions of qualities and pro￿ts com-
pared to cooperative regulation of such an organized MNB. Loan qualities
and bank pro￿ts are then strictly increasing going from a non-cooperatively
to a cooperatively regulated branch structure, and further to a coopera-
tively regulated and ￿nally a non-cooperatively regulated subsidiary struc-
ture. The diﬀerences tend to be ampli￿ed, the less positively correlated the
returns are.
These results are formulated concisely in the following proposition13
Proposition 6 Suppose returns are jointly normally distributed.
(I) If increased quality works to increase the mean of the return distribution,
then the marginal social bene￿ts of quality are independent of bank structure:
MS
i (q1,q 2)=MB


















(II) If increased quality works to lower the variance of the return distribution,
then MS
i (q1,q 2) >M B
i (q1,q 2),a n dt h ed i ﬀerence increases with smaller k

















i . The quality and pro￿t levels in the branch
case decrease with smaller k (more home bias) and with smaller ρ.
The ￿rst parts of statements (I) and (II) are proved in the appendix.
The induced eﬀects on quality and pro￿t s ,w h e nc o m p a r e dw i t hc o o p e r a t i v e
regulation, then follow straightforwardly. Given the results of Proposition
2, the comparison with non-cooperative regulation also follows.
Compared with coordinated regulation of a subsidiary-organized MNB,
there are two main eﬀects on regulatory policy. Ceteris paribus, the likeli-
hood of paying a social cost bankruptcy is reduced when merging the two
loan markets in one corporate entity, and the home-country regulator does
not pay the social costs of bankruptcy in the host-country (home-bias). As-
suming normal return distribution and variance reducing quality, the home-
country regulator of a branch-organized MNB induces lower quality of bank
loans compared with both coordinated regulation and strategic regulation
of a subsidiary-organized MNB. The reason why the marginal social gain of
quality is unaﬀe c t e di nc a s e( I ) ,i st h a tt h ed i r e c thome-bias eﬀect is exactly
balanced by the induced increase in the probability of the bankruptcy event.
13Superscripts C and NC refer to the cooperative and the non-cooperative policy, re-
spectively.
23Uniformly distributed returns: quality-induced ￿multiplicative￿ shifts.
Let now H(s)=s be the uniform CDF on [0,1] and suppose returns ri
are of the form (25). For independent returns we then have ri = Q(qi)zi







, 0 ≤ ri ≤ Q(qi)
The distribution for the sum r = r1+r2 can be straightforwardly derived (see
appendix), and we can as above compare reserve levels and marginal bene￿ts
of quality (MB
i ,MS
i ) for a branch structured and a subsidiary structured
MNB, respectively. These considerations allow us to compare outcomes in
terms of loan qualities and bank pro￿ts for settings (i), (ii) and (iii). To
compare these to outcomes for setting (iv) (non-cooperative regulation of
subsidiaries) we need to make further assumptions. We then assume, in line
with the speci￿cation in section 5, that we have uniform F(θ) and quadratic
Q(.) and ψ(.);




(Σqi − βθ)2, c>0.
In the appendix we then prove the following.
Proposition 7 Suppose returns are distributed according to (25) with z1,z 2
iid U[0,1].
(I) The marginal social bene￿ts of quality are then higher for the branch
structure; MB
i (q1,q 2) >M S
i (q1,q 2),a n dt h ed i ﬀerence increases with smaller














(II) Under non-cooperative regulation loan qualities and bank pro￿ts may be
higher or lower for the branch structure compared to the subsidiary structure.
In particular for θ uniform and Q(.) and ψ(.) quadratic as speci￿ed above
we have: if
cβ
￿ Q2 is suﬃciently large (respectively small), then for ￿ Q1 suﬃ-


















8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have analyzed how entry of multi-national banks aﬀect
banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands internationally
with subsidiaries, the MNB operates under the legislation of several countries
- both the home country and the host countries. Although these countries
have agreed upon minimum standards and supervisory principles, such as
in the EU directives or the Basle Accords, substantial degrees of freedom
24are still left to national regulators. For instance, ￿gures presented in BIS
(1999) shows that there is no clear evidence that the variation in capital
ratios between G-10 banks has been reduced since the 1988 Basel Accord.
Host country regulation of MNB subsidiaries is shown to create cross-
border externalities, where the supervisors and regulators in one country
will be concerned about the standards in the home country and in other
host countries. Our main results are as follows.
First, there is a regulatory induced contagion of macroeconomic shocks
between the two countries. If one of the two countries experiences an eco-
nomic downturn, the regulatory induced quality of the loan portfolios in
both countries are aﬀected with equal strength. Banks of suﬃciently high
(low) intrinsic quality will experience a deterioration (improvement) of in-
duced quality of the loan portfolio in both markets if one of the markets
experiences an economic downturn.
Second, lack of international coordination of banking regulation works
to lower capital adequacy requirements. However, in equilibrium regulators
respond by increasing incentives to improve asset quality, making the prob-
ability of banking failure insensitive to the decentralized nature of banking
regulation.
Third, ownership of the MNB is shown to be of importance for the out-
come of strategic banking regulation. If the MNB is owned by sharehold-
ers from outside the market operated by the bank (￿third-country share-
holders￿), the regulatory regime becomes more distortive since regulators
become more eager to extract banking pro￿ts. Consequently, with more
￿inside-shareholders￿, the regulatory policy becomes more pro-bank indus-
try inclined.
Fourth, if the MNB chooses branches instead of subsidiaries, regulation
becomes centralized. The entire branch-organized MNB is regulated by
the home-country. Compared with coordinated regulation of a subsidiary-
organized MNB, there are two eﬀects on regulatory policy. Ceteris paribus,
the likelihood of paying social bankruptcy costs is reduced when merging the
two markets in one corporate entity (diversi￿cation), and the home-country
regulator does not pay the social costs of bankruptcy in the host-country
(home-bias). Depending on the stochastic properties of the risky returns on
loans, and the way that quality improvements aﬀect these returns, the MNB
may prefer either a subsidiary structure or a branch structure.For normally
distributed returns, the regulatory policy makes the MNB prefer (weakly) a
subsidiary form. With uniform return distributions, the MNB may prefer a
branch form.
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27Appendix
Section 5 (Parametric speci￿cation):
Note ￿rst that (since rb
i =1− Ri) conditions (10),(11) can be written

























i\qi(θ)) + 1 − re =0 ,i =1 ,2 (29)
Given that G(r\qi)=G( r
Q(qi)) where G(t) is a CDF on some interval [0,ﬂ t]
and Q(qi) is increasing, then r = tQ and so E(r\qi)=Q(qi)γ, where γ = Et

























where k(re,b) is a constant independent of qi; this follows from (29), which
for the present speci￿cation says that bG(
rb
i
Q)=re−1.W es e et h a tk(re,b) is
an increasing function of re−1
b . Letting m(re,b)=γ+bk(re,b) the optimality
condition for qi in the cooperative case can then be written as stated in the
text. Clearly m(re,b) is increasing in re, and derivation of bk(re,b) shows
that m(re,b) is decreasing in b.
For the non-cooperative case, substituting (20) into (19) yields
m ￿ Q1
¡
ﬂ q − (1 − θ)q0¢
+m ￿ Q2 =2 c
¡








Collecting terms we get two equations for ﬂ q and q0:
m ￿ Q1ﬂ q + m ￿ Q2 =2 cﬂ q − cβ






This yields the solutions stated in the text..
28Section 7 (Branches versus subsidiaries)
Proof of Proposition 6 (normal distribution)
(I). Consider ￿rst the case where quality aﬀects only the mean ￿i =




































































i irrespective of parameters.








































zφ0(z)dz = Ez =0
(This negative sign means that reduction of variance (σ0















r − ￿1 − ￿2
￿ σ
)










Note that, from above






































































The ￿rst two factors are each > 1( f o rk<1), while the last factor is < 1.
For k =1the ratio is
q
2
1+ρ > 1 for all ρ < 1 We now show that the ratio





We have from above




























Below (see ￿Claim￿) we prove that the denominator is decreasing in k.T h i s










> 1 for ρ < 1
Claim. k
R z(k)
−∞ zφ0(z)dz is decreasing in k.



















































This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7 (uniform distribution)
P r o o fo fs t a t e m e n t( I )
Consider ri = Qi(qi)zi, zi ∼ U[0,1],a n dt h u sG(ri\qi)= ri
Qi, 0 ≤ r ≤ Qi.
For the subsidiary case the break-even return rb







































To consider the branch case , let ￿ G(r\q1,q 2) be the CDF for the sum r =


















2(Q1 + Q2 − r)2⁄
for Q2 ≤ r ≤ Q1 + Q2
In equilibrium we will by symmetry have Q1 = Q2. Note that we then have
￿ G() = 1
2 for r = Qi. We consider two subcases.
31Case1 Suppose ￿rst re−1
kb < 1



































































where the inequality follows from re−1
kb < 1
2 and k ≤ 1.
Case 2. Suppose next re−1
kb > 1
2 Now rb is given by
re − 1
kb




















2 +3 rbQ2 − (rb)2
Q2
1Q2















































































































32One can check that the expression in the last bracket is positive for all
x ∈ (0,1) and k ≤ œ 1. This completes the proof of statement (I.a)
Proof of statement (II) (Subsidiary vs branch under non-cooperative
regulation)
Suppose ri = Q(qi)zi, where zi ∼ U[0,1], Q0(qi)= ￿ Q1qi+ ￿ Q2, ψ(e)=c
2e2




￿ Q2 is suﬃciently




























We shall show that for ￿ Q1 ≤ 0 suﬃciently close to zero the MNB￿s pro￿ti s
larger (smaller) in the subsidiary case under decentralized regulation
Consider the subsidiary case. Letting ￿ Q1 become zero we have, from
the discussion following (20), that q0 =
β
2 and the strategic eﬀect becomes
so strong (
dqi
dqj = −1) that the costs associated with rents vanish for each
regulator. According to (19) the condition determining qS
nc(θ) then takes
the form
m(re,b) ￿ Q2 = c(2qS
nc(θ) − βθ)=ψ0(2qS
nc(θ) − βθ)
where the expression on the left-hand side is the marginal social bene￿to f
quality in any country, i.e. equal to Eqiri+MS
i . For the present speci￿cation
this is equal to (see (30) above)













The incentive constraints imply that the MNB￿s pro￿ts (rents) satisfy d
dθπS
nc =





βm(re,b) ￿ Q2dθ0 = π0 + βm(re,b) ￿ Q2θ
Consider next the branch case. The equation determining the (symmetric)
solution qB
nc(θ) for that case takes the form
MB(re,b)=ψ0(2qS
nc(θ) − βθ)+βc(1 − θ)
where the last term represents the costs associated with rents, and the term
on the left-hand side is the marginal bene￿t of quality in the branch case;
i.e. equal to Eqiri +MB



















￿ Q2 ≡ mB(re,b,k) ￿ Q2
33T h ei n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n ta l l o w su st os o l v ef o rt h eM N B ￿ sp r o ￿ts in a similar






MB(re,b) − βc(1 − θ0)
¢
dθ0
= π0 + β
￿


















This is negative (positive) for all θ in (0,1] when the stated condition holds.
QED
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